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ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING OR REPRODUCTION
CONTROL: SHOULD CALIFORNIA COURTS USE
NORPLANT TO PROTECT FUTURE CHILDREN
FROM CHILD ABUSE AND FETAL ABUSE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Allowing a trial court to order a defendant not to become preg-
nant as a condition of probation has never survived appellate scru-
tiny.' Appellate courts have always reversed probation conditions re-
quiring the defendant not to have children until she married' or
completed probation.' Probation orders requiring sterilization have
also been declared invalid.' In 1991, a judge in Tulare County, Cali-
fornia, challenged this precedent by ordering Darlene Johnson to
have a new birth-control device, Norplant,' inserted in her arm as a
1. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984) (reversing a condition of pro-
bation requiring a defendant convicted of child endangerment and violation of a child custody
decree not to conceive during the five-year probationary period); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d
7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (striking probation conditions prohibiting marriage and preg-
nancy for ten years, but validating probation condition prohibiting custody of children for
defendant convicted of aggravated child abuse); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989) (vacating condition of parole that prohibited defendant convicted of endangering a
child from becoming pregnant, but analyzing parole condition as though it were a condition of
probation); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (striking probation
condition that defendant convicted of child abuse not have a child for a period of five years); cf.
Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (vacating probation condition
that prohibited male defendant guilty of negligent child abuse from fathering a child while on
probation).
2. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967); Thomas v. State, 519 So.
2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Jackson, 484 So. 2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
3. See cases cited supra note 1.
4. Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d 1101 ,(Ariz. 1986) (granting relief from a condi-
tion requiring male and female defendants convicted of child abuse to be sterilized). But see
Mark Curriden, Sterilization Ordered for Child Abusers, A.B.A. J, May 1993, at 32 (discuss-
ing recent probation condition for tubal ligation given by a judge in Tennessee to a woman
convicted of sexually abusing her children that has not yet been challenged and that the judge
claims "is different from ones stuck down because the defendant voluntarily agreed to steriliza-
tion"). While Smith and Howland both involve a male defendant's right to procreate, Smith,
725 P.2d at 1102; Howland, 420 So. 2d. at 919, this comment focuses on female defendants
and the use of Norplant. "At present, men face no similar threat of reproductive control,
although that could change if a male contraceptive implant, now being developed, becomes
available." Marilyn Gardner, Birth Control by Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 15,
1991, at 15.
5. "Norplant was developed for the purpose of expanding available methods of contra-
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condition of probation for a child abuse conviction.
The first use of Norplant as a probation condition7 received na-
tionwide attention.' The Johnson case generated debate in the legal
community,9 the medical community,10 and the public at large."
The California Court of Appeal was going to review the validity of
the "Norplant condition"; however, the case was involuntarily dis-
missed because Johnson violated another condition of her probation
that made the Norplant condition moot. 2 Since the legality of the
Norplant condition was never decided in the Johnson case, the possi-
bility exists that another court might order Norplant (or some other
similar type of birth control) as an alternative sentence for a woman
convicted of either child or fetal abuse.
The State's interest in protecting children from the harms of
ception and for the purpose of insuring access to reproductive choice for all women. It was
developed out of a respect for human dignity and out of a belief that women should be able to
have the number of children they want, when they want them." Appellant's Opening Brief at
13, State v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. filed Jan. 23, 1991, and dismissed
Apr. 13, 1992), appealing No. 29390 (Super. Ct. Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991) (quoting Dr.
Philip Darney, a research scientist for Norplant's approval by the FDA); see WYETH-AYERST
LABORATORIES, NORPLANT SYSTEM LEVONORGESTREL IMPLANTS (1990) (on file with Santa
Clara Law Review).
6. Judge Orders Birth-Control Implant, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 4, 1991, at
3B. Darlene Johnson pled guilty to three counts of violating Penal Code § 273d. She was
accused of punishing two of her children by beating them with a belt and an electric extension
cord. She had no other prior convictions for child abuse. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2 n.1,
Johnson (No. F015316).
7. Gardner, supra note 4, at 15. The probation order came only three weeks after the
Food and Drug Administration gave its approval of the device. Id. The first voluntary use of
Norplant after its approval did not occur until a month after the probation order. Woman
Receives Record Implant, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, at B2.
8. See Sixty Minutes: Norplant (CBS News television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1991) (cov-
ering the use of Norplant in sentencing Darlene Johnson); William Booth, Implanted Birth
Control Ordered for Child-beater, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 5, 1991, at Al; Judge Orders Birth-
Control Implant, supra note 6, at 3B.
9. Dorothy J. Rivette, Norplant: Alternative Sentencing or Biological Control?, Re-
marks at the Santa Clara University Health Care Law Society Meeting (Oct. 9, 1991); see
Sixty Minutes: Norplant, supra note 8.
10. Kathleen West et al., Case Comments, IssuES & INSIGHTS (Education Programs
Associates, Campbell, Cal.), Aug. 1991.
11. E.g., Christy Scattarella, Forced Birth Control? Drug-baby Boom Sparks Call to
Control Female Addicts, SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 1991, at Al; Don Williamson, Norplant:
Forced Surgery Is No Answer, SEATTLE TIMES, June 27, 1991, at A12; Brian Templeton,
Forced Birth Control? Voluntary, Paid Sterilization, SEATTLE TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A7;
Eric Steig, Forced Birth Control? Mothers Cast as Criminals, SEATTLE TIMES, July 2, 1991,
at A7; Cynthia Cofield, Forced Birth Control? Drug Abusers Not Mentally Competent To
Make Decisions, SEATTLE TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A7.
12. Interview with Margaret C. Crosby, Attorney for Appellant Darlene Johnson,
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, in San Jose, California
(May 2, 1992).
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fetal abuse and the foster care system is attracting support for court-
ordered birth control."3 However, the Norplant condition raises sev-
eral constitutional concerns. The use of this type of coercive repro-
ductive control restricts several constitutional rights and may violate
the defendant's right to due process."' The Norplant condition may
also be a form of cruel and unusual punishment-due to its similar-
ity to involuntary sterilization-and its use may violate the right to
equal protection."' Any use of the Norplant condition by trial courts
must be given a thorough analysis to avoid a repetition of the eugen-
ics movement' 6 or any resemblance to the fictional Republic of Gil-
ead described in The Handmaid's Tale."
This comment examines the validity of reproduction control as
a condition of probation. The background addresses the factual, le-
gal, and policy concerns raised by the Norplant condition. First, the
medical history of the Norplant device is described.' Second, the
cases dealing with the validity of probation conditions forbidding
pregnancy introduce the statutory and constitutional due process re-
quirements of a probation condition in California.' 9 Third, develop-
ments in fetal rights cases20 and problems with the foster care sys-
tem"' show potential compelling interests that may satisfy the due
process requirements of probation. Finally, cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and equal protection challenges that apply to the Norplant
condition are discussed. 2
13. See discussion infra part II.C.
14. Jack P. Lipton & Colin F. Campbell, The Constitutionality of Court-imposed Birth
Control as a Condition of Probation, 6 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 271, 272-83 (1989) (con-
stitutional right of privacy for contraception, procreation, parenting, and free exercise of reli-
gion); see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 42, Johnson (No. F015316) (arguing that the
Norplant condition burdens procreative choice and the right to bodily integrity).
15. See discussion infra part II.D.
16. Appellant's Opening Brief at 60-61,Johnson (No. F01 5316); see infra note 157 and
accompanying text; see also Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 289-93 (discussing involun-
tary sterilization).
17. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986); Gardner, supra note 4, at
15 (comparing the dangers of ordering Norplant as a condition of probation to the situation
experienced by the main character in The Handmaid's Tale, where reproduction is completely
state-controlled).
18. See discussion infra part II.A.
19. See discussion infra part IIB.
20. Deborah J. Krauss, Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal
Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523
(1991); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1309 & n.130 (1991).
21. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 14-17,Johnson (No. F015316).
22. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 272 (analyzing the constitutionality of State
v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa County Sept. 2, 1988)).
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The analysis examines the legality of the Norplant condition by
looking at hypothetical defendants who have been convicted of child
neglect,"3 cruelty to a child,24 or felony corporal punishment.2" This
section considers whether the Norplant condition is cruel and un-
usual punishment, violates the statutory and constitutional due pro-
cess requirements of probation, and violates equal protection.
After determining the likely outcome of constitutional objections
to the Norplant condition, this comment proposes methods to elimi-
nate the coercive use of Norplant by trial courts. This goal is achiev-
able by improving the methods used by judges to sentence women in
child-abuse cases and limiting trial court discretion to create condi-
tions of probation. Birth control methods such as Norplant should
either be proposed by the defelidant for sentence mitigation or or-
dered by a hearing officer after procedures similar to involuntary
sterilization proceedings.26
23. California Penal Code § 270 states:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care
for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Cal. Penal Code § 270 (Deering 1985).
24. California Penal Code § 273a states:
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce
great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or
inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the
care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of
such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in
such situation that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by impris-
onment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for 2, 4,
or 6 years.
(2) Any person, who, under circumstances or conditions other than those
likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any
child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,
or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person
or health of such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health
may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (Deering 1985).
25. California Penal Code § 273d states:
Any person who willfully inflicts upon any child any cruel or inhuman
corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition is guilty of a
felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for 2, 4, or 6 years, or in the county jail for not more than one year,
or by a fine of up to six thousand dollars ($6,000) or by both.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d (Deering Supp. 1993)
26. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1950-1969 (Deering 1991).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to the Norplant System
The medical community considers the Norplant System (levo-
norgestrel implants) a revolution in birth control.2" The implants
work automatically without the need for taking a pill or inserting a
diaphragm.28 Studies show Norplant has more than 99 percent effi-
cacy for five years. While Norplant's minute failure rate compares to
sterilization, Norplant is reversible when removed.29
Norplant does not have the side effects associated with oral con-
traceptives containing estrogen.30 However, the prescribing informa-
tion contains a list of both minor and serious adverse reactions that
may occur.3 The manufacturer recommends a complete medical his-
tory and physical examination before insertion and annual follow-up
examinations.32 The device is contraindicated for women with a
medical history of liver disease, heart disease, blood clots, high blood
pressure, diabetes, breast cancer, or mental depression.3" Women are
also advised not to smoke while using Norplant. 4
Norplant takes about ten to fifteen minutes to insert and twenty
minutes to an hour to remove. 5 Under a local anesthetic, a two-
millimeter incision is made in the inside of the upper arm in order to
27. $500 Implant Considered Reliable Contraceptive, SEATTLE TIMES, June 24, 1991,
at A4.
28. Id.; WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 5.
29. WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 5. Studies show a Norplant failure
rate of .2% and a sterilization failure rate of .2 to .4% during the first year. The manufacturer
advertised that over 500,000 women in seventeen countries have used the device with a contin-
uation rate of 81% after one year. Id.
30. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, State v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th
Dist. filed Jan. 23, 1991, and dismissed Apr. 13, 1992), appealing No. 29390 (Super. Ct.
Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991); WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 5 (describing the
risks related to estrogen-containing oral contraceptives, which include the following: elevated
blood pressure, strokes, vascular problems, hepatic tumors, ocular lesions, and gall bladder
disease).
31. WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 5 (menstrual bleeding irregularities
such as prolonged bleeding, spotting, amenorrhea, and frequent bleeding, delayed follicular
atresia that could require surgery, ectopic pregnancies (but same percentage as those not using
birth control or other methods), minimal cancer risk from incision site, itching or infection at
incision site, possibility of scarring at site, headache, nervousness, nausea, dizziness, adnexal
enlargement, dermatitis, acne, change of appetite, mastalgia, weight gain, hair loss, breast dis-
charge, cervicitis, musculoskeletal pain, abdominal discomfort, leukorrhea, and vaginitis).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; $500 Implant Considered Reliable Contraceptive, supra note 27.
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insert six thin silicone rubber tubes in a fanlike arrangement.3 6 The
tubes contain a birth control hormone, levonorgestrel, which is re-
leased into the bloodstream in a steady, low dose that becomes effec-
tive approximately twenty-four hours after insertion.3
There are several health-related factors that must be considered
before a woman and her doctor choose Norplant as a suitable birth-
control method. The judge in the Johnson case, however, only dis-
played a cursory knowledge of Norplant during the sentencing
phase. 8 He did not consider whether Johnson had any contraindica-
tions or objections to the possible side effects and health risks of Nor-
plant." The manner in which Johnson received the Norplant condi-
tion provides legitimate reasons to void her consent."' However, this
comment focuses on the legal issues other than lack of informed con-
sent that are triggered when a judge orders birth control as a condi-
tion of probation: due process, equal protection, and cruel and un-
usual punishment. The next section introduces the judicial history of
probation conditions prohibiting pregnancy. These cases provide the
necessary background for a due process analysis of the Norplant
condition.
B. Judicial History of Conditions of Probation that Prohibit
Pregnancy
Due process requires that conditions of probation restricting ac-
tivity that is not criminal and that is constitutionally protected meet
both statutory"1 and constitutional requirements."' California Penal
Code section 1203.1 requires that probation conditions be reasona-
ble."3 The constitutional test requires a'higher level of scrutiny:
36. WYETH-AYERST LABORATORIES, supra note 5.
37. Id.
38. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-10,Johnson (No. F015316).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 18-19.
41. "The discretion granted is not boundless. In the first place, the authority is wholly
statutory; the statute furnishes and limits the measure of authority which the court may thus
exercise." People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (Ct. App. 1978).
42. Id.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (Deering Supp. 1993). The statute provides in part:
The court may impose and require any or all of the above-mentioned terms
of imprisonment, fine, and conditions, and other reasonable conditions, as it may
determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that
amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to
any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the
reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer . . ..
1022 [Vol. 33
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Where a condition of probation requires a waiver of precious
constitutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to
the extent that it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the
compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is
an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamental
constitutional rights.""
Federal case law follows the same approach45 and has been used by
California appellate courts as a guide in their analysis."
1. - Judicial Approach to Conditions Prohibiting Pregnancy
for Crimes Unrelated to Children
People v. Dominguez4 7 established the standard judicial test for
determining if a condition was "reasonable" under Penal Code sec-
tion 1203.1."' The court held that under the statute a condition of
probation is invalid if it "(1) has no relationship to the crime for
which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not
in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not
reasonably related to future criminality." '49 The test ensures that
conditions of probation do not exceed the statutory limits set on trial
court discretion. 50
In Dominguez, upon finding the twenty-year-old defendant
guilty of second-degree robbery, the trial court ordered the defendant
not to become pregnant until she was married.5 1 She was already
pregnant, had two other children supported by public assistance, and
44. People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1971); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr.
357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984); In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565-66 (Ct. App. 1979); People v.
Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 189 (Ct. App. 1978).
45. "Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights
may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does in fact
serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety." United States v. Consuelo-Gonza-
lez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898
(9th Cir. 1980) (invalidating condition of probation as not reasonably related to rehabilitation
or public safety).
46. E.g., Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 187, 191-92.
47. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967).
48. Id. at 293; Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
49. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293; see also People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal.
1975) (stating the following in adopting the Dominguez test: "Conversely, a condition of pro-
bation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is
reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future
criminality.").
50. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293; see also People v. Richards, 552 P.2d 97, 100-03
(Cal. 1976) (interpreting the "broad discretion" granted trial courts under California Penal
Code § 1203.1 in determining the validity of a probation order for restitution).
51. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92.
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had never been married.52 The defendant violated her probation by
becoming pregnant with her fourth illegitimate child, and she
claimed her pregnancy resulted from a failure of birth-control
medication.5"
The appellate court found the defendant's prospective preg-
nancy had no reasonable relationship to either her robbery conviction
or possible future criminality.54 The court also decided that the pub-
lic interest in reducing the number of illegitimate children requiring
welfare was an inappropriate motivation for conditions of probation
designed to reform and rehabilitate offenders. " The court invali-
dated the probation revocation and struck the condition forbidding
pregnancy.56
Two recent cases from jurisdictions outside of California also
invalidated conditions forbidding the birth of illegitimate children for
crimes not related to the care of children. 7 In State v. Norman, the
defendant, who had been convicted of forgery, challenged the condi-
tion requiring her not to give birth out of wedlock as a violation of
her privacy.58 Applying the "reasonable relationship test," '59 the
Louisiana appellate court struck the condition because no facts in the
record showed that the crime related to the responsibilities of caring
for the defendant's children." In Thomas v. State,"1 a Florida appel-
late court also applied the same type of three-prong test. The court
held that the order not to become pregnant during probation unless
married was "grossly erroneous on its face" as applied to a defend-
ant who had committed grand theft and battery.6"
Dominguez and the subsequent cases support the conclusion
52. Id. at 292.
53. Id. at 293.
54. Id. The court also doubted the authority of the "most extreme" example of an un-
usual condition of probation which required the defendant who had syphilis and had been
convicted of rape to be sterilized. Id. (citing People v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352 (Cal. Ct. App.
1936)).
55. Id. at 294.
56. Id.
57. Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Norman, 484
So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
58. Norman, 484 So. 2d at 953.
59. Id. The court used the same three part test as Dominguez. The defendant was the
same age and already had two illegitimate children. Id.
60. Id.
61. Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
62. Id. at 1114. The court found the condition "(1) bearing no relationship to the of-
fense for which Thomas was convicted; (2) relating to conduct which is not in itself criminal;
and (3) requiring or forbidding conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality."
Id.
1024 [Vol. 33
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that probation conditions restricting pregnancy for crimes having no
direct relationship to children do not satisfy the due process require-
ments of probation. These cases also indicate that judicial concern
about the burdens on the State from illegitimate children is not a
sufficient reason to control procreation.
2. Judicial Approach to Conditions Prohibiting Pregnancy
for Crimes Related to Children
The first case to examine the constitutional merits of a proba-
tion condition not to become pregnant was State v. Livingston."3
The defendant in the case was an unmarried twenty-year-old wo-
man who had burned her seven-month-old infant by placing the
child on a space heater. 4 She pled guilty to the crime of cruel abuse
of a child resulting in serious physical harm.65 The trial court or-
dered her, as a condition of her probation, not to have a child for five
years. 6
The defendant claimed that the condition prohibiting the wo-
man to become pregnant violated the probation statute and her con-
stitutional right of privacy.6" The court decided that both objections
had merit. It held "the trial court is not free to impose arbitrary
conditions that significantly burden the defendant in the exercise of
her liberty."68 Further, the condition had only a "remote relation-
ship" to child abuse and "the objectives sought by probation of edu-
cation and rehabilitation. '"69 The court also found the restriction an
unreasonable burden on a woman who was pregnant at sentencing.70
The second case to deal with a probation condition prohibiting
pregnancy was Rodriguez v. State.71 The defendant was charged
with aggravated child abuse for hitting her nine-year-old child in the
face and against a car.72 The defendant suffered from "psychological
and alcohol-induced problems."7 3 The trial court placed four special
63. State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
64. Id. at 1336. The court also noted the defendant had an IQ. significantly below 100.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1337.
69. Id. The court also relied on Dominguez as authority for finding the condition unrea-
sonable. Id.
70. Id.
71. 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id.
10251993]
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conditions on a ten-year probation order: (1) no possession or con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages, (2) no custody of any children, (3)
not to become pregnant, and (4) not to marry without the court's
consent."' The defendant challenged the last three conditions as
"overly restrictive, overbroad and in violation of her fundamental
constitutional rights"7 to "procreation, marriage, and custody of her
children." 6
The court noted that a probationer's constitutional rights could
be restricted by conditions of probation that are desirable for the
purposes of rehabilitation." However, the probation condition must
meet a judicially imposed requirement that it serve a "useful rehabil-
itative purpose."78 Relying on the reasonable relationship test de-
scribed above for the statutory requirements of a probation condi-
tion, 9 the court held that the restriction forbidding custody of
children was valid because it was clearly related to the crime of child
abuse.8" The court found the condition prohibiting pregnancy was
invalid because it concerned noncriminal conduct and did not relate
to the crime of child abuse.81 The court also held that the relation-
ship to future criminality was unreasonable because custody of mi-
nor children was already prohibited.82
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 8 & n.1 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942); Loving v. Vir-
ginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). The defendant argued that the State failed to show a compelling
state interest as set forth in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 8 &
n.2.
77. Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9.
78. Id. The court also referred to the standards set forth by the ABA: "Conditions im-
posed by the court . . . should be reasonably related to [the probationer's] rehabilitation and
not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of religion." Id. (citing
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.2(b) (1970)).
79. Id. (citing People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975)); accord People v. Dominguez,
64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct. App. 1967).
80. Rodriguez, 78 So. 2d at 10.
81. Id. The holding is qualified by the court noting that the defendant was later found
to be eight weeks pregnant at sentencing and by the court's citation of Livingston. Rodriguez,
378 So. 2d at 10 n.5.
82. Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10. The court never addressed the State's position that the
defendant did not have the right to give birth to children who would have been given up for
adoption. Id. at 9.
A subsequent Florida case involving negligent child abuse dealt with a condition prohibit-
ing a man from fathering children. Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982). The court followed Rodriguez and upheld the conditions prohibiting the defendant
from having any contact with his child and from residing with any minor child under sixteen
years of age. Id. However, the condition prohibiting the defendant from fathering a child was
held invalid because the court found it did not reasonably relate to child abuse, that it con-
cerned noncriminal conduct, and that the relationship to future criminality was prevented by
1026 [Vol. 33
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The only California case invalidating a probation condition
prohibiting pregnancy for a crime of child abuse is People v.
Pointer.8" Ruby Pointer was convicted of felony child endangerment
for almost causing the death of her infant child from malnutrition.84
She was breast-feeding him while on an extreme macrobiotic diet
and refused to give him medical attention.85 Pointer also violated a
custody decree by abducting the child from a foster home.86
The trial court sentenced Pointer to five years of probation, in-
cluding a year in the county jail, and imposed conditions such as a
counseling program and no unsupervised visits with her youngest
child.8" The court also ordered that she not have custody of any chil-
dren without prior court approval and that she bear no children dur-
ing the period of probation.88 Pointer challenged the order not to
have children as a violation of her constitutional rights of privacy
and to procreate. 89
The Pointer appellate court noted that the trial court appreci-
ated the "extraordinary nature" of the challenged condition.9 ° A pro-
bation report showed that Pointer was unwilling to alter her con-
duct, predicting that imprisonment would not increase her sense of
responsibility, although it would prevent Pointer from harming an-
other small child in the future. 9' A psychological exam revealed that
Pointer would most likely endanger future children with the same
conduct.92 The psychologist also felt that Pointer would not comply
with an order for any type of birth-control medication, so the condi-
tion would most likely be violated. 3
The court first examined the "reasonableness" of the condition
under the Dominguez test.94 The court decided that the condition
the condition preventing custody or contact with children. Id. at 919-20.
83. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
84. Id. at 359. The child was saved when a doctor had police intervene and rush him to
a hospital for emergency procedures. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (Deering 1993) (fel-
ony child endangerment statute).
85. Pointer, .199 Cal. Rptr. at 359. Pointer's diet and maternal neglect made her older
child underdeveloped and her youngest child severely damaged with growth retardation and
permanent neurological injury. Id. at 360.
86. Id. at 359; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (Deering 1993) (felony statute pro-
scribing detention or concealment of child from a person with legal custody).
87. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 362.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 363-64; see also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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was reasonably related to child endangerment because Pointer's diet-
ary practices made the "harm sought to be prevented" to any future
children possible before their birth.95 The court distinguished cases
from other jurisdictions that found conditions prohibiting pregnancy
unreasonable in that those cases only involved the possibility of
harming children that were already born and could be handled with
a condition prohibiting custody of children. 9
Even though the court found the condition reasonable under the
statute, it still had to determine whether the condition violated the
defendant's fundamental right of privacy protected by the California
and Federal Constitutions. 97 To survive constitutional scrutiny, the
challenged condition "must be narrowly drawn" and not have
"available alternative means .. .which are less violative of a consti-
tutional right."9"
The court held that the condition was overbroad because peri-
odic pregnancy testing and prenatal and neonatal treatment pro-
grams were less restrictive alternatives to prevent injury to an un-
born child.99 The court also found the condition "troublesome"
because the possibility of violating the condition and going to prison
would encourage aborting or hiding a pregnancy.1"'
The most recent appellate case attacking a condition prohibiting
pregnancy for a crime involving some form of child abuse is State v.
Mosburg,01 which concerns a condition not to become pregnant dur-
i.ng a two-year term of parole. In that case, the forty-year-old de-
95. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
96. Id. at 364 (citing Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)); see
also State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
97. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
98. Id. at 365; see also People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 387 (Ct. App. 1983)
(breaking the criteria to satisfy the constitutional requirements for a condition of probation
into a three-part test).
99. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365. In 1991, police removed from Pointer's apartment
three young children ranging from two to six years of age. The children were all malnourished
and only able to grunt and scream. Three Malnourished Children Found in Trash-Filled
Home, Los ANGELES TIMES (Home Edition), June 22, 1991, at A27. After treatment in a
state hospital for over a year, Pointer's condition improved to the point where she could attend
court proceedings. A Santa Cruz judge declared her not to be guilty of child endangerment by
reason of insanity. Anticipating a fight on placement, the assistant district attorney "said she
will fight hard to see that Pointer goes to the hospital and stays until she is too old to bear
children." Paul Rogers, Insanity Ruling Clears Mother in Abuse Case, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Apr. 1, 1993, at IB, 4B.
100. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
101. State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
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fendant abandoned her newborn infant in a truck.10 2 She already
had three children and was involved in a divorce.' The court ap-
plied the same law that controls probation conditions for this type of
parole condition."0 4 Examining cases from other jurisdictions,' the
court held that the probation condition was an invalid intrusion on
the right to privacy.' 6 The court noted that a pregnancy created
difficult enforcement problems because the defendant could choose
only among concealment, abortion, or imprisonment.'0 7 The court
also observed that the State lacked the power to penalize someone if
contraception failed.' 0 8
While these cases are persuasive authority that conditions for-
bidding pregnancy never satisfy constitutional scrutiny in child-abuse
cases, they do not expressly address a direct order to take birth con-
trol. The only case to present this type of order never reached appel-
late review.'0 9 In State v. Forster, the trial court ordered the minor
defendant, guilty of two counts of attempted child abuse, to take
birth control for the rest of her life. The trial court rescinded the
condition after the defendant became pregnant." 0 Commentators
who have analyzed the case concluded that the birth-control order
violated substantive due process because there were less restrictive
alternatives available, such as removal of custody, counseling ser-
vices, and parenting classes."' All of these alternatives were imposed
on Darlene Johnson, yet the trial court still found it necessary to
impose the Norplant condition."'
The Norplant condition restricts procreation more severely than
a judicial order against getting pregnant and imposes an invasive
medical procedure that interferes with the right to bodily integrity." 3
102. Id. at 313-14.
103. Id. at 313.
104. Id. at 314.
105. Id. at 314-15 (citing Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984); Rodriguez v.
State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1976)).
106. Id. at 315. The court recognized that the federal right to privacy includes choices
concerning conception. Id. at 314 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685
(1977)).
107. Id. at 315.
108. Id.
109. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 271-72.
110. Id. at 297-98.
111. Id at 285.
112. Appellant's Opening Brief at 57, State v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App.
5th Dist. filed Jan. 23, 1991, and dismissed Apr. 13, 1992), appealing No. 29390 (Super. Ct.
Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991).
113. The right to bodily integrity has been developed under a line of cases concerning
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However, it also eliminates concerns expressed by the Pointer and
Mosburg courts about penalizing the defendant if pregnancy re-
sults."1 4 Whether a defendant can successfully void the Norplant
condition on due process grounds is discussed in the analysis. " 5 The
following section examines the state interests that might validate a
Norplant Condition.
C. Development of State Interests that May Support the Norplant
Condition
Any restrictions on the exercise of constitutional rights in condi-
tions of probation must "serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation
and public safety.""' 6 The trial court in Johnson decided that the
Norplant condition served both of these purposes: "It is in the de-
fendant's best interest and certainly in any unconceived child's inter-
est that she not have anymore children until she is mentally and
emotionally prepared to do so."' The court wanted Johnson to
complete counseling and parenting classes before having a sixth child
in order to increase the likelihood of rehabilitation and to decrease
the likelihood of future child abuse." 8
In the Forster case discussed above, commentators concluded
that the State lacked sufficient interest in unconceived children and
that the court could impose less restrictive probation conditions than
birth control, such as removal of custody and parenting classes." 9
However, their conclusion that a probation condition cannot prohibit
the right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 36-37, 39-40 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 "(1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229
(1990); People v. Adams, 265 Cal. Rptr. 568, 572 (Ct. App. 1990); Conservatorship of
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854-55 (Ct. App. 1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct.
App. 1984)); see also Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 276 ("Every method of birth
control ...necessitates some form of bodily intrusion.").
114. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 100, 107-08.
115. See infra part IV.B.
116. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975); People v.
Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 192 (Ct. App. 1978).
117. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 8-9, State v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct.
App. 5th Dist. filed Jan. 23, 1991 and dismissed Apr. 13, 1992), appealing No. 29390 (Super.
Ct. Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991).
118. Id. The State provided authority to show that the birth of another child would
increase the risk of the defendant abusing her children. The risk factors for child abuse and
neglect included: "(1) environmental stresses causes by financial problems, unemployment,
marital difficulties, physical illness, untimely child bearing, or other problems; (2) social isola-
tion, particularly lack of a network of supportive relationships; and (3) poor parenting skills."
Id. at 9.
119. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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pregnancy is weakened by recent developments in the field of fetal
rights and the foster care system.120
1. The Impact of Fetal Rights on a Condition Prohibiting
Pregnancy
The State, whether in the context of probation or not, clearly
has an interest in the health and safety of living children. Child-
abuse prosecutions and dependent-child petitions provide the means
for states to limit or sever parental rights in order to protect chil-
dren.' 2 ' The "parens patriae power" even obligates the states to in-
tervene in nontreatment decisions of handicapped infants that do not
meet the standard of " 'best interests' of the child.' ' 22
The State also has an interest in fetal development. At common
law, fetal rights depended on live birth.' 23 With the ability of mod-
ern technology to treat the fetus independently of the mother, mod-
ern law has started protecting the fetus before birth and balancing
the state concern for a healthy fetus with the privacy rights of the
mother.' 24 When protecting the state interest in fetal rights, the State
restricts maternal "rights of privacy, autonomy, and bodily
integrity.' 25
The main battleground between fetal rights and maternal rights
is the right to abortion. Until the passage of Roe v. Wade,'26 states
120. See infra text accompanying notes 121-45.
121. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 270, 273a, 273d (Deering 1985 and Supp. 1993); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (Deering Supp. 1993).
122. SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGE ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS & THE LAW 169
(1987). Federal regulations require individual states to establish special procedures for neona-
tal care of handicapped newborns as a condition of federal funding for child-abuse programs.
The impetus for federal involvement was a court decision allowing parents to withhold life-
saving surgery from a newborn with Down's syndrome. However, protection of children from
child abuse and neglect still remains a "state and local responsibility." Id. at 177-78, 181.
123. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1558-59 & n.14 (1990) (property, inheritance, tort, and criminal law).
124. Id. at 1556 (noting changes in the law due to the ability to diagnose and treat the
fetus and knowledge of the detrimental effects of maternal conduct on fetal health). There is a
trend among doctors to treat the fetus as a "second patient with many rights and privileges
comparable to those previously achieved only after birth." Krauss, supra note 20, at 529 &
n.39 (quoting JOHN WHITRIDGE WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS at xi, 867-71 (1985)).
125. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 123, at
1556; see ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 253-54; Krauss, supra note 20, at 523-25
(analyzing disproportionate effects on women of color from fetal rights measures in prosecution
of pregnant women using illegal drugs and court-ordered Caesarean sections); cf MacKinnon,
supra note 20, at 1300-01, 1307 (suggesting that fetal rights and other means of limiting a
woman's procreation rights are based on men's desire to control women through their
children).
126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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were allowed to criminalize abortion. 27 While the federal right of
privacy presently permits a woman to terminate a pregnancy, it is
not an absolute right.' 8 The right to an abortion can be restricted by
the State when "important and legitimate" state interests in mater-
nal health and "protecting the potentiality of human life" become
compelling.' 9 The plurality opinion and the concurring opinion by
Justice Scalia in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.. indicate
that the present Court is less protective of the right to abortion and
may overturn Roe, giving the states greater power to regulate abor-
tion for protection of the fetus.''
Unlike the Federal Constitution, the California Constitution
makes privacy an express inalienable right.13 2 The California Su-
preme Court has interpreted the state right to privacy to encompass
procreative choice and to give broader protection than the federal
right to privacy. 83 If Roe is overturned, federal privacy law will
probably permit greater restrictions on maternal rights during preg-
nancy. In California, however, the state law will probably remain
unchanged, affording abortion rights more protection than under
127. ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 147.
128. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (establishing regulation for maternal health after the first
trimester and regulation to protect the fetus after viability). The Court's opinion undermines
fetal rights theories by recognizing that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense." Id. at 162.
129. Id. at 162-63. Subsequent cases have upheld prohibitions on public funding for
abortion, see Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 917 (1980);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977), and other statutory restrictions, see Thornburgh v. American College of Obst.
& Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Danforth v. Planned
Parenthood, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); contra Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
130. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
131. Id. at 537-38 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[Tihe plurality and Justice Scalia would overrule Roe . . . and would return to the States
virtually unfettered authority to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-di-
recting decisions whether to carry a fetus to term."). The main arguments for overruling Roe
include the belief that abortion should not be covered by the fundamental right to privacy,
viability is too arbitrary a line, and the life of the fetus should have the same protection as that
of the mother throughout pregnancy. ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 148, 157-60.
132. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. "All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." Id.
(emphasis added).
133. Compare Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal.
1981) (holding that Medi-Cal funding for elective abortion for indigent women cannot be
withdrawn under California constitutional test for denial of a fundamental right) with Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (holding that federal funding for abortion can be denied be-
cause not seen as an obstacle to abortion).
19931 NORPLANT CONDITION 1033
federal law.
Fetal rights are also used as a justification to restrict maternal
rights after a woman decides to carry the child to term."" Courts
have permitted doctors to compel women to have blood transfusions
and Cesarean sections against their will.' 35 Women have been incar-
cerated or committed to institutions for the duration of their
pregnancies when their drug use or other behavior may harm the
fetus. 138
Other efforts to control a woman's behavior during pregnancy
include criminalizing fetal abuse3 7 and promulgating fetal protec-
tion policies, which prevent women from working in jobs with possi-
ble hazards to a fetus."3 " Some states, through legislative or judicial
action, have changed their child abuse and drug distribution statutes
to cover fetal abuse.'3 9 While not as extensive as some states, Cali-
fornia law contains some provisions that penalize fetal abuse by the
mother.14o
134. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 123, at
1565. The court decisions in this area reflect that the judiciary favors fetal rights while the
commentators favor maternal rights. Id.
135. MacKinnon, supra note 20, at 1301 n.95; Developments in the Law-Medical
Technology and the Law, supra note 123, at 1566-72. A national survey showed that 13 out of
15 orders for Caesareans in 11 states had been granted. Id. at 1567. One commentator believes
these decisions have little authoritative value due to the rashness of the decisions in emergency
situations and misplaced reliance on Roe v. Wade because the opinion places the fetus
subordinate to the woman's life and health. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-62; ELIAS & ANNAS, supra
note 122, at 256-57.
136. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 123, at
1572-73. A California court decided that § 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code could not
be used to detain a pregnant woman by declaring her unborn fetus a dependent child of the
court. However, the woman could have been detained if proper mental health commitment
proceedings had been brought. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (Deering Supp. 1993); In re
Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528 (Ct. App. 1981).
137. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 123, at
1574-76, 1579-80.
138. Id. at 1577-79. But see UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991), rev'g
886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that sex-specific fetal protection policy that prohibited
all women not documented infertile from working in jobs involving actual or potential unsafe
exposure to lead was discriminatory on its face and a violation of Title VII as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
139. Krauss, supra note 20, at 525-27 & nn.17-24; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 415.503(9)(a)(2), 415.504, 775.082(3)(b), and 893.12(3)(c) (West Supp. 1992).
Some observers call the prosecution of addicts who give birth to drug-addicted babies
"cruel and unusual punishment" since most are poor and are often denied access to drug
treatment centers because they are either pregnant or on Medicaid. These women are also
denied public funding for abortions. Michele Mager, The Sins of the Mothers, STUDENT
LAW., Sept. 1991, at 30, 33.
140. Section 270 of the Penal Code proscribes as a misdemeanor the willful omission of
a parent "without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary ... medical attendance, or other reme-
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While a women's right to terminate a pregnancy can be re-
stricted to protect the health and safety of the fetus, this does not
completely determine whether the State has an interest in preventing
conception of a child. The appellate court in the Pointer case recog-
nized that protecting the fetus from maternal behavior was reasona-
bly related to the purposes of probation, but the court decided that
less restrictive alternatives such as prenatal monitoring were suitable
substitutes."" However, harm to the fetus can occur before the wo-
man is aware she is pregnant, 42 and states may not have the re-
sources to implement monitoring programs. 43 Under these circum-
stances, a court might find that the State has a compelling interest in
restricting pregnancy.
2. The Impact of Foster Care on a Condition Prohibiting
Pregnancy.
Some courts have decided that prohibiting custody of children
during the period of probation makes forbidding pregnancy unneces-
sary.' 44 This alternative depends on the ability of the State to remove
the child to a foster home. As the State noted in its brief for the
Johnson case, there is some doubt as to whether this option supports
the State's interest in protecting children because foster care "does
not take into consideration the best interests of the child.' 1 45 In
dial care for his or her child" and applies to "children conceived but not yet born." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (Deering 1985); see ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 261 (criticizing
action brought under § 270 against a mother whose disregard of medical advice during preg-
nancy was responsible for her child's death six weeks after birth from brain damage); cf Reyes
v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913-14 (Ct. App. 1977) (dismissing felony child-endan-
germent action brought under Penal Code § 273(a) against a mother who continued to take
heroin during pregnancy without seeking any prenatal care because there is no legislative in-
tent for § 273(a) to protect the fetus, as opposed to murder under § 187, which specifically
includes protection for the "fetus").
A mother can also be penalized for fetal abuse by losing custody of her child in a depen-
dency action under § 300 of the California Welfare and Instititions Code. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 300 (Deering Supp. 1993). See In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that a woman's drug use during pregnancy can be used in a dependency
action to remove custody of a child born under the influence of drugs).
At the present time, California's drug possession and distribution statutes do not contain
any provisions to protect the fetus. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350-11382.5 (Deer-
ing 1984 & Supp. 1993).
141. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1984).
142. ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 197-99.
143. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
144. See cases cited supra note 96.
145. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 14, State v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct.
App. 5th Dist. filed Jan. 23, 1991 and dismissed Apr. 13, 1992), appealing No. 29390 (Super.
Ct. Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991) (using this argument to counter removing future children
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reaching this conclusion, the State relied on two studies of the state
foster care system. These studies indicated problems with monitoring
by social workers as well as inadequate health care and overcapacity
in foster homes, which place children at a "serious risk of being
emotionally damaged, neglected, or physically abused.
'1 46
D. Is a Probation Condition Ordering Birth Control Cruel and
Unusual Punishment or a Violation of Equal Protection?
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Involuntary
Sterilization
Under Solem v. Helm, 47 the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause forbids both "barbaric punishments" and "sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed."' 48 The case lists the fol-
lowing objective factors to be considered in a "proportionality analy-
sis" of the punishment: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harsh-
ness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions."' 49 California follows the
same guidelines to determine whether a sentence is "so dispropor-
tionate to the crime . . . that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity."' ° As some commentators
have noted, an order to use birth control may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.'' The order to use birth control may cause
psychological harm from stigmatization and, in addition, most birth
control methods involve health risks.152
Courts have already determined that involuntary sterilization is
from Johnson's custody as a least restrictive alternative).
146. Id. at 15-17 (citing AUDITOR GENERAL OF CAL., REPORT BY THE AUDITOR GEN-
ERAL OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES COUNTY NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS SERVICES TO FOSTER
CHILDREN AND THE STATE NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF THE COUNTY'S FOSTER
CARE PROGRAM (1990); COMMISSION OF CAL. STATE GOV'T ORG. AND ECONOMY, THE
CHILDREN'S SERVICES DELIVERY SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT (1987)).
147. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
148. Id. at 284.
149. Id. at 292.
150. In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972).
151. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 286-88. The Federal Constitution provides
protection from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. States provide iden-
tical protection under their own law. E.g., ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 17.
152. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 286-88 (citing Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1961)) (law making status of addiction to narcotics a misdemeanor invalid as cruel
and unusual punishment).
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a cruel and unusual punishment for certain crimes.15 Norplant is
the form of birth control closest to sterilization. Its efficacy is compa-
rable to sterilization, it involves a surgical procedure, and it is effec-
tive without the woman's efforts. 1 54 Only one state court has consid-
ered a probation order for sterilization in a child-abuse case. In
Smith v. Superior Court,'5 5 the trial court imposed a condition of
sterilization on male and female defendants convicted of felony child
abuse for the death of their child. 186 Following the majority of cases,
the Arizona Supreme Court held that sterilization should not be re-
quired as a condition for a lesser sentence without specific statutory
or constitutional authority. The court never reached the issue of
cruel and unusual punishment.157 The court looked at the California
Supreme Court's decision in Conservatorship of Valerie N.' 58 as
representative of the minority view that allows sterilization of incom-
petents without specific statutory authority.' 59 The court stated,
153. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (holding that vasectomy for certain
types of criminals is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment); Davis v. Berry, 216
F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (holding that vasectomy is cruel and unusual punishment for
criminals twice convicted of a felony), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1916).
An area comparable to the sterilization cases is surgical castration. An Arizona Attorney
General opinion stated that a proposed bill to make the penalty of castration for rape of a child
victim would be unconstitutional. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 291; accord State v.
Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410-12 (S.C. 1985) (invalidating a condition of surgical castration because
it violated state constitutional prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
155. Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986).
156. Id. at 1102.
157. Id. at 1104. The court reviewed the judicial history of the eugenics movement that
sought to prevent burdening society with the birth of defective persons. The movement was
popular in the United States between 1907 and 1963. Several states passed laws that allowed
compulsory sterilization of criminals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists in state institutions when
recommended by a panel of experts. Id. at 1103 (quoting Annotation, Validity of Statutes
Authorizing Asexualization or Sterilization of Criminal or Mental Defectives, 53 A.L.R.3d
960, 963-64 (1973)).
These laws were validated by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927):
"It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or
to let them starve for the imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind." Id. at 207. The Smith court distinguished the eugenics cases because
the sterilization was ordered to protect future children rather than to protect society from
defective children. Smith, 725 P.2d at 1103.
158. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) (declaring legislation
prohibiting sterilization as a means of contraception for a ward or conservatee who is unable to
give consent an unconstitutional violation of privacy and liberty interests).
159. Smith, 725 P.2d at 1103-04. The California legislature has since amended its stat-
utory scheme to provide specific procedures for sterilization of an adult conservatee unable to
consent and now forbids only sterilization of a minor by a guardian or conservator. CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 1950-1969 (Deering 1991). California also ensures that refusal to submit to
sterilization will not cause forfeiture of any privileges or immunities or public benefits. CAL.
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however, that the trial court could consider the defendants volunta-
rily sterilizing themselves as a mitigating factor during sentencing.'"
2. Equal Protection
The birth-control condition may also violate equal protection 61
by severely restricting the fundamental right of procreation and dis-
proportionately affecting impoverished and minority women.' 62 In
Skinner v. Oklahoma,' the Supreme Court held that the Virginia
statute allowing the sterilization of "habitual criminals" with two or
more offenses of "felonies involving moral turpitude" violated equal
protection of the law.'6 Even though police powers generally receive
great deference, making equal protection the last resort of constitu-
tional arguments, the Court decided that sterilization laws deserve
"strict scrutiny of the classification" because of the harsh impact on
the fundamental right to procreation.' 65
The Court concluded that a law making larceny subject to ster-
ilization but exempting the similar crime of embezzlement was "as
invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or
nationality for oppressive treatment."' 66 An order to use a birth-con-
trol method such as Norplant also impacts the fundamental right of
procreation. Its use in sentencing will discriminate by gender because
it can be used only on women convicted of child abuse and not on
men. The use of the Norplant condition might also discriminate
against women of color because of racial stereotypes and biases that
make women of color subject to more scrutiny for fetal abuse during
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.3 (Deering 1988).
160. Smith, 725 P.2d at 1103.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
162. See Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 288; Krauss, supra note 20, at 523.
163. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
164. Id. at 541. The petitioner also raised due process and cruel and unusual punish-
ment grounds, which were not addressed. However, Chief Justice Stone commented on the
failure to meet due process because he did not see a violation of equal protection. He found the
hearing unconstitutional because there was no determination that the sterilization was needed
for eugenic purposes. Id. at 538, 544-45. A similar problem could be found with the Norplant
condition if the judge does not develop a record that supports the need for the condition, espe-
cially in first-time cases for child abuse.
165. Id. at 541. The court described the rationale for strict scrutiny as follows:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights
of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far
reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.
Id.
166. Id. at 538-39, 541.
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pregnancy. 167
Because the Norplant condition is imposed by judicial discretion
and not by statute, the cruel and unusual punishment and equal pro-
tection challenges to the Norplant condition require a factual situa-
tion for them to be tested as applied. The analysis section utilizes
two different hypothetical defendants in order to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of these constitutional objections to the
Norplant condition.16
III. PROBLEM
No appellate court has ever approved a probation order forbid-
ding a woman to become pregnant. 69 However, the earlier cases in-
validating these conditions do not completely foreclose a probation
order to use Norplant because trial courts have broad discretion to
consider probation conditions that promote rehabilitative benefits or
protect the public interest under the specific facts of each case.1 '7
With the problems of drug use by pregnant women, an
overburdened foster care system, and the horror of repeat offenders
like Ruby Pointer,17 1 preventing a woman from having additional
children during probation may seem to be an appropriate alternative
sentence to imprisonment.
Norplant alleviates the difficulties of previous court orders that
encouraged a woman to have an abortion or hide her pregnancy to
avoid a violation;172 however, the Norplant condition generates new
legal and policy concerns. When medical technology is used coer-
cively by a court, it becomes an invasive method of reproduction con-
trol comparable to court-ordered sterilization. As the eugenics move-
ment demonstrated with involuntary sterilization, the potential for
abuse is great once a higher court allows procreation to be re-
167. See Krauss, supra note 20, at 523 (discussing the impact of forced Cesarean sec-
tions and drug babies on the judicial treatment of women of color).
168. See infra parts IV.A, IV.C.
169. See cases cited supra note 1. However, one commentator predicted that "[uintil
appellate courts definitely rule that such practices are unconstitutional, judicial excess will
continue." Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 298.
170. In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 568 (Ct. App. 1979) ("The manifest goals of
probation and the need for individualistic treatment compels the imposition of special proba-
tion conditions framed to meet the particular needs of each individual case."); People v. Keller,
143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (Ct. App. 1978); see also People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364
(Ct. App. 1984) (finding probation condition forbidding pregnancy reasonable by distinguish-
ing contrary authority due to specific facts of case).
171. See supra note 99 and text accompanying notes 136-37, 145-46.
172. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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stricted. 17 The analysis determines whether a court can legally im-
pose the Norplant condition on women guilty of child abuse offenses
by utilizing two hypothetical defendants, J and P, to determine
whether the Norplant condition is unconstitutional in three areas:
cruel and unusual punishment, substantive due process, and equal
protection.
A. Defendant J Hypothetical
J closely resembles Darlene Johnson. She is a first-time of-
fender who has been convicted of felony corporal punishment of a
child.174 Johnson fit the typical pattern of earlier cases imposing con-
ditions forbidding pregnancy: the defendant was not married, she
had several illegitimate children who had to be placed in foster care
after her arrest, she was pregnant at the time of sentencing, and she
required welfare assistance.'J has these same characteristics and is
also a member of a minority group, as was Darlene Johnson. 7
Besides the Norplant condition, the court orderedJ to remain in
the county jail until her child was born, to attend parenting classes,
and not to have custody of any children until successful completion
of parenting classes. The judge also informed J that the Norplant
device could be removed before the expiration of her probation if she
satisfied two prerequisites: she must successfully complete the
parenting classes, and the state child protection agency must return
custody of her children and determine that she can handle another
child. If J does not accept these conditions, the judge will impose two
years in the state prison.
B. Defendant P Hypothetical
P resembles Ruby Pointer, the repeat offender whose behavior
will harm the fetus.' 77 P is a drug addict, and her use of drugs while
pregnant has already caused permanent disabilities in her first two
children. These children were permanently removed from her cus-
tody by the State shortly after their birth, because she left them un-
attended and was convicted of child neglect.17 8
173. See supra note 157.
174. See supra note 25.
175. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 7-8, State v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct.
App. 5th Dist. filed Jan. 23, 1991 and dismissed Apr. 13, 1992), appealing No. 29390 (Super.
Ct. Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991).
176. Appellant's Opening Brief at 60 n.39, Johnson (No. F015316).
177. See supra note 99.
178. See supra note 23.
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P recently had another drug-addicted baby. She had custody of
the child until the baby was brought to a hospital near death after
she left the child unattended for several days while partying and tak-
ing drugs with her boyfriend. P was convicted of cruelty to a child
and faces a six-year prison sentence. The child has been placed in a
foster home.
P's drug addiction and psychological problems make her an
abusive and irresponsible parent. She has dropped out of several
drug treatment programs, and her prospects for rehabilitation are
marginal, according to the probation officer and mental health work-
ers. She presently has no desire to stop taking drugs or to stop hav-
ing children. The judge has offered the following alternative sen-
tence: one year in the county jail, completion of a drug treatment
program with follow-up care throughout probation, periodic drug
testing, mental health and parenting classes, no custody of children
without the court's permission, the Norplant condition until success-
ful completion of a drug rehabilitation program, and one year of
staying drug-free after release from jail.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Is a Norplant Condition Cruel and Unusual Punishment?
Before resolving the constitutional issue, the Norplant condition
must first satisfy the statutory requirements of probation and not be
considered as punishment. "The primary purpose of probation is to
rehabilitate the offender .... Punishment of an offender may not be
the primary purpose of the judge's imposition of probation."' 9 If its
primary purpose is punitive, the condition does not satisfy the re-
quirements of Penal Code section 1203.1.8' However, a condition of
probation is valid if it only has "an incidental punitive effect, in that
any restriction of liberty is in a sense a 'punishment.' "' The fact
scenarios forJ and P show that the Norplant condition was imposed
primarily for a rehabilitative effect.' 82 In P's case, the other motive
was to reduce the possibility of fetal abuse. Therefore, the Norplant
condition constitutes punishment for purposes of a cruel and unusual
punishment analysis because it interferes with procreation and bod-
ily integrity, but it is not invalid as a condition of probation because
there is no intent to punish.
179. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1980).
180. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
181. Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898 n.8.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18 and part III.A.-B.
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The Norplant condition might constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under both the United States and California Constitu-
tions for eitherJ or P."8' The Norplant condition must first pass the
proportionality test used in Solem v. Helm. 8 " The first part of the
test looks at the harshness of the penalty in relation to the offense.'85
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court held that imposing a
ninety-day jail sentence for addiction to narcotics was excessive and
unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment."" The case
stands for the proposition that it is disproportionate to punish certain
behavior as a "crime."' 87
The Norplant condition appears more disproportionate than the
jail sentence for drug addiction. It punishes procreative behavior that
is constitutionally protected and not criminal.' 88 However, the use of
the Norplant condition to prevent fetal abuse and promote rehabili-
tation, by relieving the defendant of the stress of pregnancy and pro-
viding incentives for behavior modification, is less harsh than a jail
sentence, which only has a punitive aspect. In fact, the Norplant
condition allows the defendant to avoid a prison sentence.
The other criteria of the proportionality test compare the sen-
tence with those imposed for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction
and with those imposed for similar crimes in other jurisdictions.'89
California has never allowed a judge to prohibit pregnancy.' 90 Addi-
tionally, in P's case, endangering a fetus is still not a crime. Impos-
ing a Norplant condition in these circumstances allows a judge to
imply that fetal endangerment by a mother is a crime. This is con-
trary to the current judicial position that providing legal protection
for the fetus is a legislative function. 9' Further, no state has ever
found a condition prohibiting pregnancy or ordering birth control
valid.'92
Two federal district court cases offer additional guidance as to
why a Norplant condition might be cruel and unusual punishment.
183. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
184. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
185. See supra text accompanying note 149.
186. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1961)
187. Id.
188. See supra note 96.
189. See supra note 149.
190. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984); People v. Dominguez, 64
Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967).
191. See supra note 140.
192. See cases cited supra note 1.
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In Mickle v. Henrichs,'98 the district court held that a vasectomy was
"cruel or unusual punishment" for a rape offense under the Nevada
Constitution. 9" The court concluded that the words "cruel and un-
usual" "forbid newly devised as well as cruel punishments."' 95 They
also felt that the Eighth Amendment is a "more humane and liberal
doctrine" that has "adaptability to restrain cruel innovations in the
way of punishment." '196 The court determined that a vasectomy was
contrary to the purposes of reformation, because a "degrading and
humiliating punishment is not conducive to the resumption of up-
right and self-respecting life."'
97
The court in Davis v. Berry also held that vasectomy was cruel
and unusual punishment.' 98 The court looked at a law that made
sterilization mandatory for anyone committing two felonies. 99 The
court compared vasectomy to castration, which at common law was
considered cruel and unusual punishment.200 Even though vasectomy
is not as physically severe, both procedures affected the "power of
procreation" and resulted in the same "public humiliation, .... degra-
dation," and "mental suffering." ''
The Norplant condition is a novel and unusual use of a birth
control device. When used coercively to force a defendant to choose
between probation or prison, the condition generates the same harm
as involuntary sterilization. Both involve a relatively simple but inva-
sive surgical procedure 20 2 and "destroy the power of procreation.
20 3
The use of the Norplant condition also places the defendant under
extreme public scrutiny.2 04 This publicity makes birth control, usu-
ally a private and personal decision, a humiliating and degrading
experience.
While Norplant is temporary sterilization, it can cause physical
suffering and is dangerous for a woman with contraindications.20 5 In
193. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918).
194. Id. at 689-91. California also uses the words in the disjunctive. CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 17.
195. Mickle, 262 F. at 689.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 691.
198. Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242
U.S. 468 (1916).
199. Id. at 414.
200. Id. at 416.
201. Id. at 416-17.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37; Mickle, 262 F. at 687.
203. Davis, 216 F. at 416.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
205. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; see also Lipton & Campbell, supra
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fact, the physical suffering imposed by the Norplant condition is an-
other possible grounds for invalidation. One court found that
"[d]eliberate indifference to a [probationer's] serious medical needs
may constitute the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain that the
[E]ighth [A]mendment proscribes."' 06
California no longer permits nonconsensual sterilization of de-
velopmentally disabled individuals for eugenic reasons and allows
sterilization of a conservatee only after a showing by clear and con-
vincing evidence of its necessity by the conservator who is seeking the
power to consent.20 7 The consensual aspect of the Norplant condition
is dubious, especially for someone such as J, a first-time offender
who presents no harm of fetal abuse. Faced with the alternative of a
prison sentence, most women will likely accept the Norplant condi-
tion despite the medical risks they might not assume without the
threat of incarceration. The judicial use of Norplant is contrary to
the present public policy against involuntary sterilization and should
have at least legislative authorization before being utilized by the
judiciary.2"8
If it is considered cruel and unusual punishment, the Norplant
condition is absolutely prohibited. The court in State v. Brown in-
validated a condition of probation requiring surgical castration for
reduction of a thirty-year sentence for brutal sexual assault.20 9 Even
if the defendant consents to the condition, a "[c]ourt cannot impose
conditions which are illegal and void as against public policy."2 10
Due to the sensitive nature of birth control as a private and
constitutionally protected activity, the potential for unusual and seri-
ous emotional and physical consequences, and the similarities of in-
voluntary sterilization to a Norplant condition, a court could ration-
ally decide that the Norplant condition is cruel and unusual
punishment. However, a court will likely find otherwise because a
probation condition differs from mandatory sterilization in that it
note 14, at 287-88 (discussion of health risks of various methods of birth control which may be
cruel and unusual punishment). For women close to menopause, the Norplant condition would
be the equivalent of permanent sterilization.
206. Gunter v. State, 736 P.2d 1198, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
207. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 764-66, 777 (Cal. 1985) (describing
the statutory development of involuntary sterilization in California and the procedures for al-
lowing a conservator to consent to sterilization on behalf of a conservatee).
208. See Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986).
209. State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411-12 (S.C. 1985) (finding probation condition
prohibited by S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15, which prohibits infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment).
210. Id. at 411.
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can be rejected by the defendant; unlike castration, women use the
Norplant condition in a noncriminal setting; and the Norplant condi-
tion is only temporary.
B. Does the Norplant Condition Violate Due Process?
The next part of the analysis proceeds on the assumption that a
cruel and unusual punishment defense does not work for either P or
J. Therefore, the Norplant condition must be assessed under the stat-
utory and constitutional tests applied in People v. Pointer.21' These
tests will determine whether the Norplant condition violates due
process.
1. Is the Norplant Condition Reasonable?
The reasoning in Pointer can be used to meet the less demand-
ing statutory test required under People v. Dominguez.2" 2 While
birth control is a more specific method of restricting pregnancy, the
desired result is the same. Pointer and P both share a behavior that
makes pregnancy related to child abuse and that causes harm to the
fetus. While the court cannot punish P directly for bearing drug-
addicted babies, fetal rights policies would justify the Norplant con-
dition as an appropriate preventive step. For P, having a baby would
most likely result in future criminality as well. P already has three
children suffering from the same type of abusive behavior, and she
does not possess the present ability to change her behavior withoyt
outside intervention.
Establishing the reasonableness of the Norplant condition for J
is more difficult. Other jurisdictions have always invalidated a condi-
tion prohibiting pregnancy at this stage because the condition was
too remotely related to the crime and because it severely restricted a
fundamental constitutional right.213 However, these cases can be dis-
tinguished in three critical areas. First, these decisions were influ-
enced by the defendant's violation of the condition by becoming preg-
nant.214 The chance of pregnancy while on Norplant, however, is so
low that a court no longer has to worry about a violation of the
211. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
212. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct. App. 1967); see supra text
accompanying notes 95-96.
213. Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Mosburg,
768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1976).
214. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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condition unless the device is removed.2" 5 This also eliminates the
court's fears that the condition effectively coerces a defendant to have
an abortion or hide pregnancy, which deprives the fetus of adequate
prenatal care.
Second, the prior decisions did not consider the potential reha-
bilitative aspect of preventing more children. The Norplant condition
for J terminates when she completes her parenting classes and is
judged a suitable parent to resume care of her existing children.
Having another child creates a stronger likelihood that further child
abuse will continue and that attempts at rehabilitation will not be
successful.
Finally, prior decisions rationalized that the condition prohibit-
ing custody of children would be an adequate measure to prevent
future criminality.216 Such a condition also serves as a deterrent to
becoming pregnant if the woman wants custody of her child at birth
because the baby will be removed. However, this condition forces the
child into a foster care system that is no longer able to protect the
best interests of the child, according to recent state reports. 1 ' This
situation makes the prevention of future children who will have to be
removed a more reasonable option. The foster care argument is also
distinguishable from the condition in Dominguez, which was in-
spired by the judge's desire to eliminate future children who would
probably become tax burdens, because the safety of children is a le-
gitimate purpose of probation.218
2. Is the Norplant Condition a Constitutional Restriction on
Privacy and Bodily Integrity?
Assuming that the condition is reasonable for both P and J, the
Norplant condition must also meet the stricter scrutiny of the three-
part constitutional test used in California to test conditions of proba-
tion that restrict constitutional rights.2"9 Courts allow more restric-
tions in conditions of probation, so fundamental rights are not abso-
lutely protected and can be "reasonably restricted in the public
215. See supra text accompanying note 29.
216. See cases cited supra note 213.
217. See text accompanying notes 144-46.
218. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
219. People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 387 (Ct. App. 1983); see supra notes 77-82
and accompanying text (showing how this test was applied in Pointer). This approach is very
different from the one used to analyze the constitutionality of the birth control condition used
in State v. Forster. The commentators relied only on major cases protecting fundamental
rights from legislative interference, and did not consider the special analysis most courts per-
form for conditions of probation. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 283-85.
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interest. '"20 The test requires the Norplant condition to serve the
compelling purposes of rehabilitation and public safety by being nar-
rowly drawn.22'
a. Reasonable Relationship to Rehabilitation and Public
Safety
The Norplant condition must "reasonably relate to the intended
purpose of the legislation" to satisfy the first prong of the test.222 In
P's case, the Norplant condition has been linked to her successful
completion of a drug treatment program and staying off drugs for a
year. Since her drug addiction is one of the major causes of her crim-
inal behavior, a probation condition designed to promote recovery
from her addiction should satisfy the rehabilitative purpose.
Additionally, P will be prevented from having another drug
baby while the Norplant condition is in place. Cases based on fetal-
rights theories have established that the State has a legitimate health
and safety interest in preventing exposure of unborn children to drug
and alcohol abuse.22 While California does not go as far as some
states in protecting the fetus with the full force of the criminal
law,22 P has already come under the court's jurisdiction for criminal
behavior, making the State's interference more justifiable.
The use of the Norplant condition withJ also has some merit as
serving both the rehabilitation and public-safety purposes. First, the
court has imposed the Norplant condition in a limited manner to
ensure that some of the risk factors of child abuse are removed until
J completes a parenting class and has successfully received custody of
her children.225 The Norplant condition places pressure onJ to reha-
bilitate; however, she may also resent the court's interference with
her personal life. This could impede long-term rehabilitation that the
parenting classes and mental health counseling seek to foster.
Second, the Norplant condition supports the State's interest in
the health and safety of children by reducing the number of children
in foster care. The condition prevents future children from needing
220. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387. "Conditions which infringe on constitutional rights
are not automatically invalid. Certain intrusions by government which would be invalid under
traditional constitutional concepts may be reasonable at least to the extent that such intrusions
are required by legitimate governmental demands." In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Ct.
App. 1979); United States. v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.14 (9th Cir. 1975).
221. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984).
222. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 121-43.
224. See supra note 140.
225. See supra note 118.
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foster care while the defendant is most at risk of a relapse and makes
reunification of the defendant with her present children more likely.
The State's argument that the foster care system is not in the best
interests of children helps support this last proposition.22
b. Proportional Assessment of the Impact on
Fundamental Rights with the State's Compelling Interests
To satisfy the second prong of the test, the public interest in
imposing the Norplant condition must outweigh the restriction on
constitutional rights.22 7 The Norplant condition severely restricts the
exercise of fundamental privacy rights protecting procreation, contra-
ception, and parenting as well as interfering with the defendant's
privacy right to bodily integrity. 28 The public interests in this con-
text are the ones for rehabilitation and public safety described
above.229
A judicially imposed Norplant condition forces P and J to
choose between imprisonment and the waiver of fundamental privacy
rights. With the scope of the abortion right under federal law in-
creasingly limited and likely to be overruled,2 30 states have more
power to encroach on the decision whether or not to bear a child.
While California still gives great weight to the right to have an abor-
tion, this right protects the right to terminate a pregnancy, not the
right to start one. However, by its enactment forbidding the condi-
tioning of public benefits on submission to abortion or surgical steril-
ization, the California legislature has indicated that state interference
in procreation decisions should not involve coercion.2" 1
In child-abuse cases, where the State is already directly super-
vising the woman's role as a parent, there are compelling reasons for
state interference with procreation. The State has a strong interest in
preventing victims of child and fetal abuse. The interest in P's case
is stronger-due to the presence of both risks-but J's case also in-
volves the compelling state interests of rehabilitation and public
safety. Additionally, the amount of coercion in criminal sentencing
can be distinguished from granting public benefits because people
receiving benefits are more favored than criminals, and the benefit
programs have greater potential for abuse and arbitrary application
226. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
227. People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 387 (Ct. App. 1983).
228. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 283-85.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 213-18.
230. See cases cited supra note 129.
231. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.3 (Deering 1988).
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by administrators.
As established in Skinner v. Oklahoma," ' which involved a
criminal sentence of involuntary sterilization, " ' the right to procrea-
tion is constitutionally protected. A sentence aimed at the destruction
of procreation is carefully scrutinized to ensure that it is used only
when absolutely necessary. " 4 This concern is partly diminished by
the temporary nature of the Norplant condition, especially if the
court has not acted arbitrarily and has fashioned the Norplant condi-
tion to produce constructive behavior. In the hypothetical fact pat-
terns for both P and J, the Norplant condition has a rational basis
for application.
The rationale for Roe v. Wade23 provides a counterargument
to the condition's interference with contraception. The Court in Roe
emphasized the medical aspect of the abortion decision and the need
to prevent unnecessary state interference in the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, especially in the early stages of pregnancy. " ' The Norplant
condition allows the State to interfere with the doctor-patient rela-
tionship at an even earlier stage. It prevents a woman from choosing
the method of birth control she and her doctor decide is best suited
for her. If the defendant has the contraindications for Norplant,2 7
the State's interest would probably not be strong enough to expose
her to serious health risks.
The relationship between physician and patient also raises con-
cerns regarding the infringement on the right to bodily integrity. The
right of a competent adult to decide her own medical treatment is
strongly protected.238 Further, the State wants to protect the right to
individual autonomy in medical decisions.23 9 The rationale behind
the forced-Cesarean cases, however, can be used to make the right to
bodily integrity less important in the Norplant condition. When the
woman's rights are put in the fetal-rights context, the court must
balance the competing rights of the woman with the public-safety
interest in preventing harm to children before and after birth. While
decisions allowing dangerous medical procedures such as forced
Caesareans are highly disfavored by some appellate courts and com-
232. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
233. Id. at 537.
234. Id. at 541.
235. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
236. Id. at 165-66.
237. See supra text accompanying note 33.
238. See cases cited supra note 113.
239. Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854 (Ct. App. 1988).
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mentators, 4 ' they support a judicial trend toward interfering with a
woman's right to bodily integrity when necessary for the best inter-
ests of children.
c. Less Restrictive Alternatives to the Norplant
Condition
Under the third prong, there must not be any alternative mea-
sures that meet the needs of the compelling interests while also being
less subversive of the constitutional rights that are being restricted. 41
The Pointer court found this part of the test the most difficult to
satisfy. 412 However, courts are allowed considerable leeway in fash-
ioning conditions of probation that are suited to the specific facts of
each case to promote the needs of society and of the individual de-
fendant.243 A good initial test of the constitutionality of the Norplant
condition is to imagine the court not being able to use Norplant or
an equally successful method of birth control because of the defend-
ant's medical history. If the facts of the case would compel the court
to impose the maximum possible imprisonment because the risks
presented by the defendant are too great and are not diminished by
other measures, then the Norplant condition would probably be con-
stitutional. While this seems likely in P's case, a court would be
acting harshly with a first-time offender such as J if some type of
alternative sentencing was not offered that would provide an oppor-
tunity for rehabilitation (such as parenting classes).
In P's situation, prohibition of drug use, enrollment in a drug
treatment program, and monitoring for drug use as conditions of her
probation are feasible alternatives. However, such conditions have
two serious drawbacks. First, studies in teratology have shown that
the fetus is most vulnerable to structural and developmental defects
from drugs and other outside agents during the first four months of
pregnancy. . 4 Harm to the fetus could be done before the State could
intervene. Second, if the defendant uses drugs, she will be impris-
oned. This penalizes drug addiction, which is contrary to the policy
expressed in Robinson v. California.2""
In J's situation, a court might decide that less restrictive alter-
natives such as parenting classes and mental health counseling do not
240. Krauss, supra note 20, at 538-41; ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 254.
241. People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 387 (Ct. App. 1983).
242. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1984).
243. See supra text accompanying note 181.
244. ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 198-99.
245. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961).
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provide sufficient rehabilitation measures and that preventing preg-
nancy is also necessary. While there is some merit to the rehabilita-
tive benefits of preventing pregnancy, the parenting classes will most
likely be considered sufficient to prevent further instances of child
abuse and be given an opportunity to succeed before such a major
infringement on privacy is allowed.
The alternative of prohibiting custody of children during the
period of probation, already implemented for P, is sufficient in other
jurisdictions for child-abuse cases.24' However, the state data indicat-
ing that foster care endangers the child's welfare makes this alterna-
tive unsatisfactory to the State.247 With someone such as J, who dis-
plays rehabilitative potential, the burden on the foster care system is
temporary and does not require placement of additional children.
The condition pi'ohibiting custody of children provides sufficient in-
centive for rehabilitation. On the other hand, P greatly burdens the
foster care system because she already has had two children perma-
nently removed, her potential for rehabilitation is poor, and perma-
nent placement of a drug baby is often impossible. Removal of cus-
tody and drug testing do not remove the risks of fetal abuse. The
Norplant condition allows the defendant to receive treatment for
drug abuse while preventing drug-addicted babies who would be at
high risk in the foster care system because of their disabilities.
The Norplant condition for a first-time offender such as J vio-
lates substantive due process because it substantially interferes with a
fundamental right when less restrictive alternatives are available that
have not been proven ineffective. A Norplant condition for a repeat
offender such as P, however, will likely survive a substantive due
process attack, especially if the court is influenced by fetal-rights pol-
icy. There are no effective alternatives to imprisonment for prevent-
ing fetal abuse, and the Norplant condition is imposed as a tempo-
rary safeguard with drug treatment and counseling to promote
rehabilitation.
C. Does the Norplant Condition Violate Equal Protection?
The Norplant condition can be challenged as a denial of "equal
protection of the laws."248 This ground is the weakest for invalidat-
ing the Norplant condition, but it should be raised to ensure equal
treatment of defendants in similar circumstances. Because the Nor-
246. Lipton & Campbell, supra note 14, at 276 n.30.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
248. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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plant condition deals with a type of reproduction control closely
equivalent to the involuntary sterilization statute invalidated in Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma,249 it should be analyzed with "strict scrutiny of
the classification.
'25 0
Men can never be subject to this type of probation condition,
even though they are guilty of the same child-abuse offense. The
equivalent methods of castration and vasectomy for men have been
declared cruel and unusual punishment,"' and there is no male
birth control method equivalent to Norplant.252 Under a Skinner
analysis, such a difference in treatment for defendants convicted of
similar crimes subject to the same terms of imprisonment triggers an
equal protection analysis.
The only rational basis for the difference in treatment between
male and female defendants would be with defendant P. She
presents a risk of fetal abuse that men do not. It is predicted that
narrowly drawn criminal fetal abuse statutes will survive equal pro-
tection challenges."' However, some maternal conduct that may be
harmful to the fetus is not likely to be subject to state criminaliza-
tion."" The better policy for most cases of child abuse is to use less
restrictive methods that do not penalize the biological differences be-
tween men and woman. These methods include education, prenatal
monitoring, and drug treatment programs.
2 55
The Norplant condition also may be applied in a discriminatory
fashion by judges with strong biases against certain racial and ethnic
groups and women on welfare. This would most likely be the claim
of a first-time offender like J who belongs to a racial minority and
who is on welfare. The majority opinion in Skinner recognized that
a sterilization law might be used to prevent the procreation of
minorities.256
249. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
250. Id. at 541.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 193-201.
252. See supra note 4.
253. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 123, at
1581-82 (finding that biological differences are acceptable grounds to treat men and women
differently).
254. Id. at 1564, 1581; see also ELIAS & ANNAS, supra note 122, at 196, 208-16 (not-
ing risks generated by legal drugs as well as illegal drugs, smoking, alcohol consumption,
chemicals in the workplace, and radiation).
255. Krauss, supra note 20, at 546-47. One commentator thinks that "any constitutional
interpretation of a sex equality principle must prohibit laws, state policies, or official practices
and acts that deprive women of reproductive control or punish women for their reproductive
role or capacity." MacKinnon, supra note 20, at 1319.
256. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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Many of the cases prohibiting pregnancy dealt with unmarried
women with illegitimate children. 5 ' The appellate court in People
v. Dominguez acknowledged that the condition forbidding pregnancy
was imposed to prevent an increase in the welfare rolls.2 58 Applica-
tion of fetal rights in other areas such as forced Caesarean sections
and fetal-endangerment prosecutions show that minorities and the
poor are unfairly singled out due to social stereotypes. 59 The fact
that the first woman chosen for a Norplant condition is African-
American and on welfare supports the fears of apparent or actual
discrimination. 60
A judge's bias for or against the use of the Norplant condition
can also have discriminatory effects. Whether the State should be
allowed to control the exercise of procreative powers is an issue with
very divergent moral and philosophical viewpoints among the judici-
ary and society at large. The court in Mickle v. Henrichs expressed
concern about the arbitrary application of a sterilization law because
some judges will find it too severe while others will not.261 The use
of the Norplant condition would most likely receive the same type of
arbitrary application because of a lack of uniformity concerning the
appropriateness of its use as a probation condition.
The Norplant condition may lead to arbitrary sentencing based
on gender, racial, and moral biases rather than on the legitimate re-
habilitative and public-safety concerns applicable to the individual
case. A Norplant condition makes uniformity difficult because it de-
pends heavily on the personal biases of the judge. Some method is
needed to eliminate the discretion of a judge to impose the Norplant
condition so sentencing in child abuse cases does not create "invidi-
ous discrimination. "262
257. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967); Thomas v. State, 519
So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1988); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
258. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
259. Krauss, supra note 20, at 525-32.
260. Appellant's Opening Brief at 59-60, State v. Johnson, No. F015316 (Cal. Ct. App.
5th Dist. filed Jan. 23, 1991, and dismissed Apr. 13, 1992), appealing No. 29390 (Super. Ct.
Tulare County Jan. 2, 1991) (suggesting that criteria used for contraceptive control will be
discriminatory and that Johnson's status as a welfare recipient and African American might
have influenced the judge).
261. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 688 (D. Nev. 1918). "It is a notorious fact that
many judges do not regard mutilation as a wise or a lawful method of punishment. It is only
those of the contrary opinion who will prescribe vasectomy as a part of the punishment for this
offense." Id.
262. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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V. PROPOSAL
A. Legislative Action to Remove the Norplant Condition from
Judicial Discretion During Sentencing
Because of the due process objections to a Norplant condition
and the likelihood of arbitrary and discriminatory use by judges,
Norplant as well as other birth control methods should not be al-
lowed in the sentencing of child-abuse cases. A legislative act to limit
the court's statutory authority rather than a judicial decision based
on constitutional violations is preferable. The wide discretion given
trial courts in fashioning probation conditions severely narrows the
holding of each case. A legislative act will also eliminate the timely
appeal process on a case-by-case basis and promote uniformity in
child-abuse sentencing.
To limit trial court discretion and to provide more direction in
child abuse cases, the California legislature should amend Penal
Code section 1203.1 as follows:
Upon conviction of any offense involving child abuse or neglect,
the court may require ... that the defendant shall participate in
counseling or education programs ... including, but not limited
to, parent education or parenting programs operated by commu-
nity colleges, school districts, other public agencies, or private
agencies and substance abuse programs operated by public
agencies or private agencies. The court shall not impose any
conditions restricting the defendant's ability to procreate.26
In order to ensure that probation conditions adequately serve
rehabilitative and public-safety purposes, a uniform preliminary sen-
tencing procedure must be implemented. A child-abuse offender
should be required to undergo a thorough psychological examination
and counseling process to determine what measures would best pre-
vent future child abuse or fetal abuse. This was the step undertaken
by the judge in Pointer.2 4
The defendant should also be given access to family planning
and medical counseling, so she can choose Norplant or any other
method of birth control suited to her personal and medical concerns.
Voluntary use of birth control should be considered by the trial court
for sentence mitigation only upon the defendant's initiation. The
263. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (Deering Supp. 1993) (proposed changes are in ital-
ics and drafted to be gender-neutral).
264. People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 362 (Ct. App. 1984).
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court in Smith v. Superior Court suggested this approach in the
child-abuse case involving sterilization. 6 However, the judge will
have to rely on the sincerity of the defendant in her promise to use
birth control because the sentence cannot make birth control a pro-
bation condition. This should eliminate concern about the voluntari-
ness of the defendant's decision to use birth control that is raised by
civil rights advocates and medical practitioners when a court orders
the use of birth control as a condition of probation and claims that
the defendant consented to waiving constitutional rights. 66
The legislature should also provide adequate support for pre-
ventive and rehabilitative programs. Prevention of fetal and child
abuse requires public assistance in the following areas: prenatal care
for the poor, parenting skills training, education and job training,
and alcohol and drug abuse treatment programs for pregnant
women.
B. Norplant with Procedural Safeguards
Reproductive control by the State should only be used when the
defendant has severe emotional or substance-abuse problems and has
received a prison sentence. This category includes defendants such as
P, repeat offenders showing no potential for rehabilitation because
there is a great likelihood that they will continue to harm children if
allowed to have them. Voluntary use of contraception for this type of
defendant would not be an adequate safeguard. Such defendants can-
not be trusted to keep using birth control on their own, and preven-
tion of procreation is necessary for their release from prison to safe-
guard public safety.
After receiving her sentence, a defendant such as P should be
given a special administrative hearing to determine the feasibility of
using Norplant as a parole condition for early release from prison.
Norplant should only be imposed if it is in the best interests of both
the defendant and the State. The hearing officer will have to take
into account the medical risks to the defendant, the importance of not
being imprisoned to her rehabilitation, and the defendant's personal
beliefs about using birth control. This hearing requires adequate tes-
timony by medical professionals and psychologists to determine suit-
ability for the Norplant condition. These hearings should also be
265. Smith v. Superior Court, 725 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986) ("[Hlad the defendants vol-
untarily sterilized themselves, the trial court could have legitimately taken that fact into consid-
eration in sentencing the defendants.").
266. See Curriden, supra note 4, at 32.
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confidential to avoid the stigma associated with coercive birth control.
Relevant sections from chapter 6 in the Probate Code on sterili-
zation provide a good starting point for drafting this type of compre-
hensive legislation.2 67 The legislation should be drafted to ensure
that appropriate physical and psychological exams are conducted and
that the hearing officer has a list of factors to use to determine when
Norplant should be offered as a parole condition.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reproductive control does not belong in the California criminal
justice system under most circumstances. The Norplant condition is
closely related to involuntary sterilization, a method considered cruel
and unusual punishment. The Norplant condition will often violate
statutory and constitutional safeguards for most defendants. Further,
the application of the Norplant condition is certain to result in equal
protection abuses due to judicial bias and prejudice. The application
of fetal protection laws already shows that women of color and the
poor are disproportionately singled out. 68 The sentencing system
must ensure that all women are treated fairly and equally.
The use of Norplant or any other birth control device should
not be allowed as a condition of a lesser sentence. The legislature
needs to provide sentencing guidelines for child abuse that prohibit
the use of birth control such as Norplant, provide for an adequate
rehabilitation evaluation, and give specific examples of what types of
probation conditions are valid. A defendant should only use birth
control on her own initiative or in proceedings after sentencing when
a Norplant condition is justified by her best interests as well as the
State's best interests.
The words of Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma provide cautionary advice for further debates on
reproduction control: "There are limits to the extent to which a leg-
islatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments at
the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a
minority-even those who have been guilty of what the majority de-
fine as crimes. ' 69
Denise Edson Stich
267. CAL. PROBATE CODE §§ 1955, 1958 (Deering 1991).
268. Krauss, supra note 20, at 523.
269. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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